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agreed that the natural father should be
considered the primary source for child
support and recognized that caution must
be exercised when imposing child support
liability on a non-biological father. In addition the dissent, like the majority, believed that an estoppel may arise even
when there is no intent to mislead, if the
actions of one party cause a prejudicial
change in the welfare of another. However, the dissent disagreed with the majority's reasoning that financial detriment
is the only type of detriment, such being
the sole reason the majority denied the application of equitable estoppel. Id. at 541,
510 A.2d at 556.
The dissent concluded that emotional
detriment should be sufficient to establish
the element of detriment, and the facts in
Knill supported a finding of emotional
detriment. /d. at 547, 510 A.2d at 559. In
light of the circumstances in Knill, the dissent observed the duration of the husband's
representations to determine whether a true
paternal relationship developed between
Charles and Stephen. Moreover, the frustration of the realistic opportunity to discover and establish a relationship with the
natural father was considered. Finally, the
dissent noted the devastating effect on a
child's welfare where a long established
paternal relationship has been breached
resulting in the child being proclaimed a
bastard and left without a father. The dissent ultimately determined that detriment
was in fact established, and therefore
Charles should have been precluded from
disavowing parental responsibility for
child support. Id. at 554, 510 A.2d at 560.
In Knill, the court stated that since statute of limitations no longer exist in paternity suits Cledythe could maintain a successful paternity action against Stephen's
natural father. Furthermore, even though
Charles knew Stephen was not his son, the
conduct which he demonstrated was consistent with Maryland's public policy of
strengthening the family unit. Maryland
encourages such conduct so long as it does
not interfere or deprive the child or mother
of the right or opportunity to seek legal
support from the natural father.
In Maryland, as in the majority of other
jurisdictions that have addressed this issue,
a husband may not be equitably estopped
from denying child support to an illegitimate child. In Knill, a case of first impression, the dissent would have considered
whether the paternal relationship did, in
fact, exist. The end result in Knill is that
Charles Knill, who voluntarily assumed
the role as a father, has no legal duty to
support Stephen. But in the final analysis
Stephen will suffer the "ultimate humiliation of having no support from a man who

for all purposes was his father for fourteen
years." Brieffor Appellee at 6.
- William James Momson, III

United States, Petitioner fJ. American
Bar Endowment et al.: SUPREME
COURT FINDS CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATION'S INSURANCE
PROGRAM TAXABLE
The Supreme Court recently upheld a
tax assessment by the IRS against the
American Bar Endowment (ABE) concerning income received from an insurance
plan made available to its members. In
United States, Petitioner v. American Bar
Endowment et al., 106 S.Ct. 2426 (1986),
the Court decided two issues related to the
particular plan. First, whether income derived from the insurance plan constituted
"unrelated business income" subject to tax
under §§511 through 513 of the Internal
Revenue Code (Code), 26 U.S.C. §§511513, and second, whether the members
who participated in the plan could claim a
charitable deduction for those premium
payments which amounted to dividends
on behalf of the ABE.
The ABE is a corporation exempt from
taxation because it is "organized and operated exclusively for charitable ... or educational purposes." 26 U.S.C. §501(c)(3).
In order to fund its charitable work, the
ABE provides group insurance policies to
its members. By purchasing insurance as a
group, the ABE has bargaining power that
an individual would lack. Furthermore,
the cost of the insurance to the group is less
because it is based on the group's claims
experiences instead of general actuarial
tables. Normally, the cost of this plan to
the insurance company is less than the
premiums paid by the ABE, thereby entitling the ABE to a "dividend." Instead of
dispersing the amount of the dividend
among the participating members, the
ABE retains the whole dividend amount to
aid its fund-raising efforts. Members are
required to agree to this arrangement as a
condition to participation in the insurance
plan. They have also been advised by the
ABE that relinquishment of the dividend
constitutes a tax-deductible contribution
to the ABE, thereby making the after-tax
cost of the insurance, "less than the cost of
a commercial policy with identical coverage
and premium rates." 106 S.Ct. at 2429.
The ABE was assessed a tax deficiency
after an audit by the IRS in 1980. Its insurance plan was considered an "unrelated
trade or business" such that any profits
realized were subject to tax. 26 U.S.C.
§§51l-513. The ABE paid the taxes as-

sessed, and then brought an action in the
Claims Court for a refund after all administrative remedies had been exhausted. Individual participants who had not yet
taken a deduction for the excess premiums
paid brought an action for refunds as well.
The two suits were consolidated for trial in
the Claims Court.
The Claims Court found in favor of the
ABE in its suit, holding that its insurance
plan did not constitute a "trade or business" for purposes of the tax. The court's
conclusion was based on the following four
factors:
(1) The program was developed as a
means of raising funds for the
ABE's educational efforts.
(2) The program's success in generating dividends evidenced noncommerical behavior.
(3) Together, participants could change
the program to reduce premiums.
(4) The ABE was not in competition
with other non-charitable companies because it did not underwrite or act as a broker.
In the individual respondent's action, the
court held that they had failed to show that
the insurance was purchased at a greater
price ''with the intention that the excess be
used to benefit a charitable enterprise,"
and were thus denied a charitable deduction. 4 Cl.Ct. 415 (1984). On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed the decision of the Claims Court
as to the ABE, but reversed and remanded
the decision as to the individual respondents for further fact-finding. The Supreme Court granted the Government's
petition for certiorari on both issues.
I. In a six to one decision, the Court held
that the insurance program offered by the
ABE constituted a trade or business for
purposes of the unrelated trade or business
tax. By definition, the Code sets up a threepart test for determining whether a trade
or business carried on by a tax-exempt organization should be taxed. In its discussion, the Court found that the ABE's insurance program is regularly carried on,
that it is not substantially related to the
purpose of the ABE's tax-exempt status,
and that its activity is both "the sale of
goods" and "the performance of services."
Thus the three-part test is satisfied. Furthermore, the program possesses the characteristics of services provided by other
entities for a profit. After this initial conclusion, the Court went on to strike down
three of the four factors relied on by the
Claims Court in its holding.
As to the program's success in generating
dividends, the Court found this to be a
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result of monopoly pricing based on the
unique asset available to the ABE-its
members who possess "highly favorable
mortality and morbidity rates." 106 S.Ct.
at 2429. In discussing the third factorthat the participants could collectively
change the nature of the program - the
Court looked at the agreement itself which
requires assignment of the dividend as a
condition to participation in the program.
The Coun rejected the argument that the
assignment was voluntary because members could change the policy at any time,
stating that the Claims Court had put too
much weight on such an unsubstantiated
argument. Finally, the Court held that the
ABE's program was "an example of precisely the son of unfair competition that
Congress intended to prevent" by enacting
the unrelated business income tax.
If the ABE's members may deduct pan
of their premium payments as a charitable contribution, the effective cost
of ABE's insurance will be lower than
the cost of competing policies that do
not offer tax benefits. Similarly, if
ABE may escape taxes on its earnings,
it need not be as profitable as its commercial counterpans in order to receive the same return on its investment. Should a commercial company
attempt to displace ABE as the group
policyholder, therefore, it would be at
a decided disadvantage.
106 S.Ct. at 2432. The only factor in the
ABE's favor was that the insurance plan
was consistently presented as pan of its
fund-raising effort. However, the Court
felt that this factor could not stand alone as
a basis for ovenurning the assessment by
the IRS.
II. The Court upheld the finding of the
Claims Court regarding the individual
participant's claim for a charitable deduction. The fact that the respondents received
a benefit from their contribution did not
automatically make the premium payments
non-deductible. Had any of the claimants
demonstrated that the contributions were
purposely made "in excess of the value of
any benefit" received in return, then some
deduction may have been allowed under
§170 of the Code. However, none of the
respondents in the action offered any proof
that similar policies could have been purchased for a lower cost. Such a lack of proof
led the Coun to assume "that the value of
ABE's insurance to those taxpayers at least
equals their premium payments." 106
S.Ct. at 2434. Thus, no charitable motivation could be found by the Coun.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens'
main argument concerned the viability of
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the Court's analysis regarding the ABE
program and its effect on unfair competition. In focusing his argument on the
Coun's failure to justify its conclusion
with any concrete evidence, Justice Stevens
remarked,
The trial judge scoured the record for
evidence pointing to a harmful effect
on competition and found none (footnote omitted). The absence of evidence
in the record, rather than the Coun's
ruminations about possibilities and
likelihoods, should control our analysis. 106 S.Ct. at 2436.
Justice Stevens went on to refute the Court's
other findings regarding the panicipants
involuntary assignment of the dividends,
the taint of a monopoly by the ABE, and
the lack of a factual basis behind the charitable panicipation of the members, concluding that the decisions of the coun of
appeals and the claims court were correct.
The decision in United States, Petitioner
v. American Endowment et al., represents
yet another clarification' of the Internal
Revenue Code; this time affecting members of the legal community because of the
Court's interpretation of what constitutes
a trade or business for purposes of the unrelated business tax.
- Barbara E. Wixon

MacDonald v. Yolo County: THE
SUPREME COURT REEXAMINES
THE CONCEPT OF INVERSE
CONDEMNATION IN
DETERMINING WHETHER AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING
WITHOUT COMPENSATION HAS
OCCURRED.
In MacDonald v. Yolo County, 54
U.S.L.W. 4782 (U.S. June 25, 1986) (No.
84-2015), the Supreme Coun of the United
States in a 5-4 decision delivered by Justice
Stevens reaffirmed Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225 (1980), in holding
that absent knowing the nature and extent
of permitted development, the Coun cannot adjudicate the constitutionality of a
regulation that propons to limit it; in essence because limiting intense development does not prohibit all economic use of
the land sought to be developed.
In 1975, appellants submitted a tentative subdivision map to the Yolo County
Planning Commission and County Board
of Supervisors proposing to construct
a 159-home subdivision on land which

was in part a corn field. Both the Yolo
County Planning Commission and the
County Board of Supervisors, appellees,
rejected the subdivision plan. The Board
based their rejection on what they considered numerous factors "inconsistent
with the General Plan of the County of
Yolo, (and) the specific plan the County of
Yolo embodied in zoning regulations for
the County." MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. at
4782. These included: 1) the lack of access
to and from the subdivision to a public
street; 2) no provision for public sewer service by any government entity; 3) inadequate police protection for the subdivision; and 4) no provision for water or
maintainance of a water system by any
governmental entity. Id.
As a result of the Board's decision, the
appellants claimed inverse condemnation
and sought a declaratory judgment and
monetary relief.
Inverse condemnation exists when a
governmental entity restricts land use
through regulation, such as by prohibiting
development, but does not condemn the
land thereby removing the landowner's
remedy of just compensation. Agins, 447
U.S. at 255. The appellants accused the
Board of "restricting the propeny to an
open-space agricultural use by denying all
permit applications, subdivision maps,
and other requests to implement any other
use, and thereby of appropriating the 'entire economic use' of [their] propeny 'for
the sole purpose of [providing] ... a public, open-space buffer.'" MacDonald, 54
U.S.L.W. at 4782. Appellants concluded
that the Board's ruling on the regulations
denied any beneficial use of their propeny, thus it was an unconstitutional taking
without just compensation, or inverse condemnation.ld. at 4783.
The California Superior Coun sustained
appellees demurrer citing the alternative
uses appellants could make of their land
under the Yolo County Code §§8-2.502,
.503. Id. Quoting Agins, the Coun concluded that "irrespective of the insufficiency of the appellant's factual allegations,
monetary damages for inverse condemnation [based on land use regulations] are
foreclosed .... " MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W.
at 4783.
The California Coun of Appeals affirmed
the superior coun's application of Agins
where monetary damages for inverse condemnation are not permitted in California.
MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. at 4783. The
court stated that a landowner cannot recover "in inverse condemnation based
upon land use regulation." /d. In funher
tying the facts in this action to that in
Agins, the coun offered that the only remedy available to appellants would be to set

